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The Idea of Universality in the Sustainable Development Goals 
Graham Long 
 
Sustainable Development Goals are . . . universally applicable to all countries, while taking into 
account different national realities, capacities, and levels of development and respecting national 
policies and priorities.  
—Outcome document, UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals 
 
With the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) due to “expire” in 2015, interstate 
negotiations are underway at the United Nations on a post-2015 development framework, 
with a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its center. For the last year an Open 
Working Group, comprising thirty states and state “troikas,” has been working toward an 
initial draft of the goals.
1
 The outcome document, outlining seventeen goals and many 
subsidiary targets, was released in July 2014, to form the basis for a further year of 
negotiation. The “principle of universality” has been widely characterized as a foundational 
value of the goals. This article investigates this principle, and its implications for the structure 
and substance of the SDGs.  
The idea of universally applicable goals is present in both the outcome document of 
the 2012 Rio Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) that mandated the 
negotiations on the goals, and the introduction to the current draft of the goals. This marks a 
departure from the MDGs, which are widely viewed as focusing on extreme poverty, and thus 
as being directed toward poor countries.
2
 Nevertheless, despite an apparent “emerging 
consensus that the post-2015 agenda should be universal,”3 there is less agreement over what 
universality means, and how this demand should be reflected in the framework. In its most 
basic form, universality might seem simply a matter of the scope of the resulting framework. 
Actors have, however, employed and extended the idea in various ways. For example, it has 
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been a vehicle for arguments for or against different goals, or for specific levels of 
commitment within goal areas. At the same time, the SDGs acknowledge differences between 
states by allowing for differentiation at the country level. 
This article seeks to trace and clarify what the principle of universality should be 
thought to mean, what its implications are, and how it might be reconciled with country-level 
difference. The first of these issues is conceptual, while the second and third issues are more 
substantive. They ask how universality frames, constrains, and orients the goals, and how the 
need for differentiation should be interpreted and realized. Through my analysis, three 
distinct (though related) senses of universality emerge. I term these “universality of 
application,” “universality of content,” and “universal but differentiated responsibilities.”4  
It might be thought that an analysis of universality in the SDGs is unnecessary, since a 
commonly accepted understanding of universality already exists in the neighboring context of 
universal human rights. Two points are appropriate by way of response. First, universality in 
a human rights context is not simple or uncontroversial. Universal human rights can be 
understood as being universal in several senses. At a minimum, they can be thought universal 
in application (that is, standards appropriate to governing the conduct of all relevant actors); 
universal in justification (that is, be underpinned by arguments that no rational or reasonable 
person could reject); or universal in content (in looking past local or national affiliations).
5
 
Donnelly’s account of the “relative universality” of human rights, for instance, identifies 
seven ways in which human rights could be universal.
6
 For this reason, appealing to the 
universality of human rights as a parallel to the universality of the SDGs might not yield a 
ready or straightforward analysis. Further, the distinction between the SDGs, as nonbinding 
“aspirational” goals, and rights as claims or entitlements is important, both conceptually and 
practically.
7
 While there are potent arguments that the SDGs should be rights-based, the 
language of rights—and ideas of entitlements, claims, and duties—is almost wholly absent 
3 
 
from the body of the current SDG proposal. Human rights are expected to bind—both 
morally and, to a greater or lesser extent, legally. The Sustainable Development Goals are 
explicitly not expected to do so.
8
 They will be accompanied by a framework of monitoring, 
but eschew a language of responsibility and accountability. This is not to dismiss the value of 
a project assessing the links between human rights and the SDGs, but to indicate that 
transferring the notion of universality from one to the other is not straightforward. 
The role of universality and difference in wider discussions of development should 
also be acknowledged, though it is not my central concern here. For some of its critics, 
development is problematic—and has been problematic throughout its history—precisely 
because of the universal pretensions of its Western-centric perspective.
9
 In response, 
alternative accounts of development, such as post-development, appeal to a reaffirmation of 
local difference.
10
 It is not immediately clear, though, how far this critique is a rejection of 
universality, or instead a rejection of what is being universalized. How are we to interpret an 
ambition of “an ethics of development that subordinates economic objectives to ecological 
criteria, human dignity, and social justice,”11 if not as universal? This larger set of debates 
over development is not the immediate concern of this article, but it represents an important 
context for the SDGs. Critics of development as economic growth might view the recognition 
of environmental issues, participation, equality, and reform of global institutions in the SDGs 
as offering a better vision of development than what has gone before. Indeed, the SDGs 
might represent a chance to correct “the distortions” of the Millennium Development Goals 
and “recapture the narrative” of development.12  
The issue of universality and difference in the SDGs is politically important in at least 
four ways. First, it bears on both the structure and content of the framework that results. As I 
discuss below, universality can be thought of as a demand of the whole framework, the 
content of individual goals, and/or the responsibilities for realizing them. Second, how 
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universality is understood, and how successfully it is judged to have accommodated state-
level difference, may be key to the success or failure of the negotiations. Third, UN member 
states are also beginning to ask what universality will mean in practice for their countries, in 
their specific contexts.
13
 An examination of universality, then, helps determine what it might 
require of states after agreement in September 2015. Fourth, countries have their own 
accounts of what universality is and how far it should extend. These different accounts, which 
can clash, will serve to legitimate some outcomes of the SDGs over others. Lastly, the idea of 
universality is also a useful lens through which to highlight key theoretical and normative 
issues in relation to the goals. While there might not be a direct parallel between universal 
human rights and the universality of SDGs, universalism in moral and political philosophy 
has been thought central to moral cosmopolitan theories of global justice, such as those of 
Thomas Pogge and Simon Caney.
14
 A clearer account of universality in the context of the 
SDGs is a starting point for a clearer assessment of the relationship between such theories 
and the SDGs. The academic normative analysis of the SDGs is in its infancy. It is helpful, 
though, to note two links to cosmopolitan theory. One worthwhile question concerning the 
SDGs is how far they incorporate a cosmopolitan account of global justice. For instance, the 
Open Working Group (OWG) outcome document offers commitments on basic human needs, 
global equality and equity, and democracy and political liberties, and these can be evaluated 
against the desiderata specified by cosmopolitan theories of justice.
15
 Second, a key question 
for cosmopolitan theorists is how a cosmopolitan account of justice can be realized within a 
system of institutions that are profoundly interstate (notwithstanding the complexity and 
plural character of the global institutional framework).
16
 The SDGs, again, might be 
evaluated in this light.  
 The article proceeds in four parts. First, I give a brief outline of the SDG framework, 
its origins, and the current UN process. Second, I outline a conception of the universality of 
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the SDGs as defining the scope of application for the goals—their “universality of 
application”—and ask how even such an affirmation of universal scope might constrain the 
substance of the SDG agenda. Third, I discuss a prominent way in which the content of the 
goals might be thought universal in terms of its level of ambition—the adoption of “zero-
based” goals. This idea bites harder on the way each goal is formulated, and I term it 
“universality of content.” Lastly, I address the question of differentiation, outlining the 
different potential tensions between universality and differentiation. I draw a distinction 
between differentiation in targets and responsibilities. From the latter, I develop and critique 
an account of universality as “universal but differentiated responsibilities,” that is, an account 
of fair burden-sharing for the goals. Each of these three senses of universality makes a 
separate claim with respect to a distinct aspect of the SDGs, as summarized below: 
  
Sense of Universality Referent Object Key Claim 
Universality of 
application 
Whole SDG 
framework 
The SDG agenda addresses common 
concerns, and so generates demands for all. 
Universality of content Ambition of each 
goal 
Each goal should aim at global “zero,” and 
hence zero in every country, or at “access 
for all” (as applicable). 
Universal but 
differentiated 
responsibilities 
Responsibilities 
for realizing the 
goals 
The SDGs must distribute responsibilities 
fairly. 
 
 
The Sustainable Development Goals Framework 
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The Sustainable Development Goals are a central piece of the post-2015 development 
framework. With the Millennium Development Goals due to have run their course by the end 
of 2015, the outcome document of the Rio+20 summit in 2012 committed the United Nations 
and member states to the development of a replacement set of goals running to 2030, aiming 
to replicate the successes and avoid the weaknesses of the preceding framework, while 
simultaneously ensuring a greater focus on sustainable development.
17
 Currently, the SDGs 
comprise the following seventeen goals, as found in the OWG outcome document: 
 
 
Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere.  
Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable 
agriculture.  
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages.  
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all.  
Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.  
Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.  
Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.  
Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment, and decent work for all.  
Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and 
foster innovation.  
Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries.  
Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable.  
Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.  
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Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (acknowledging that 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, 
intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change).  
Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable 
development.  
Goal 15: Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt 
biodiversity loss.  
Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; provide 
access to justice for all; and build effective, accountable .and inclusive institutions at all 
levels.  
Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development.  
 
 
The SDG architecture has four components: goals, targets, indicators, and means of 
implementation. It comprises the above set of “aspirational” and “global” goals, each of 
which has further targets that are meant to be more precise and action-guiding in nature. 
Especially on the urging of the G-77 and China grouping of states, the goals also specify 
means of implementation.
18
 Currently, goal 17 covers overarching and underpinning issues, 
such as trade and finance for development, while specific means are detailed under each goal 
area. Each target will be associated with particular indicators: metrics and yardsticks that will 
be used to monitor and assess progress against the goals. 
The focus of the goals—the idea of “sustainable development”—is itself contested. 
The understanding of sustainable development emerging from the 1992 Earth Summit 
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specifies sustainable development as having social, environmental, and economic 
components.
19
 The precise balance among these elements, however, is unclear. For some, the 
idea of sustainability foregrounds the need to acknowledge, and develop within, planetary 
boundaries. For others, the focus is on poverty alleviation realized through economic 
growth.
20
 There is disagreement about how far peace and civil and political human rights are 
features of sustainable development.
21
 Given all this, some scholars view the idea of 
sustainable development simply as a “green wash” or as too vague to be helpful. Others 
suggest that the flexibility of sustainable development contributes to its usefulness.
22
 If 
sustainable development has the status of a norm—albeit a vague one of uncertain power—
the SDGs present an opportunity to promote its acceptance, and also a chance to lend greater 
specificity to its content.
23
  
 A wider post-2015 framework extends beyond the SDGs in a number of respects. 
First, other global negotiations sit alongside it, most notably the climate change treaty to be 
agreed at the UN Climate Change Conference in late 2015. Second, it is embedded in 
negotiations over financing for development more generally, and over the nascent High-Level 
Political Forum, which is conceived of as the apex of the monitoring mechanism for the 
goals.
24
 The presence of parallel processes proved helpful in streamlining the process of the 
OWG toward agreement through 2013–2014, providing opportunities to leave aside 
contentious issues of financing and accountability. Third, there will be a round of 
negotiations and assessments of the indicators used to measure progress toward the targets, 
perhaps extending past a declaration of the goals themselves.  
With the SDGs due to be signed off at a UN summit in September 2015, my analysis 
is undertaken while the goals are not yet finalized. Individual goals, and indeed the total 
number of goals, might be subject to change over the coming months.
25
 If anything, this 
makes the case for additional clarity on universality more compelling at this juncture.  
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The SDGs as Universally Applicable 
 
Universality or universal applicability is most readily understood as a claim about scope—
about the range of relevant objects or actors that this agreement covers. In the words of the 
Rio+20 summit outcome document, and the introduction to the OWG outcome document, the 
goals must be “universally applicable.” To say that the scope of something is universal is to 
say it extends to all. But what, precisely, extends to all?  
Universality of application might look like merely a synonym for global reach. It 
could appear to make no claim—and set no limit—on the content of what will be applied. 
However, on closer inspection this formulation, even in this barest form, does normative 
work by setting some limits on the subject matter of the goals. First, to make a case for 
universal application is to say that the goals must identify issues that affect all. For example, 
the recent European Union communication, A Decent Life for All: From Vision to Collective 
Action, stipulates that a “universal agenda should be built around goals and targets that are of 
concern and relevance to all countries.”26 Here, universality constrains the list of goals. In 
effect, it says that the issues addressed must be significant global ones. Second, to set a 
universal global goal is to set goals for all countries, aggregated together, at the level required 
to achieve that goal: consequently, “global goals become de facto national goals too.”27 On 
this account, a universal set of goals will potentially have implications for all state actors, 
guiding or constraining their actions. If these universal goals are to be achieved, they must be 
able to generate commitments for states (though how these commitments should be 
distributed is a further question).  
This account of universal application is in contrast to the Millennium Development 
Goals. The MDGs were goals, in effect, only for developing—and especially least 
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developed—countries, with only goal 8 having an explicit transnational component. This 
goal, to “develop a global partnership for development,” has seen little progress.28 While the 
MDGs were proclaimed as “global” goals, as a UN Technical Support Team report writes, 
“‘global in nature’ and ‘universally applicable to all countries’ are distinct concepts. The 
MDGs were global in nature, but most were not universally applicable to all countries.”29 In 
this respect, an account of universality in the two related senses above goes beyond merely 
being “global.” It sets the stage for a discussion of what individual states should be expected 
to do, and sets a baseline expectation that every state should do something. For example, the 
G-77 and China position in the OWG, that “a truly universal agenda requires tangible 
deliverables and commitments for developed countries as well,”30 can be seen as consistent 
with, and developing, this account of universality of application. Crucially, developed 
countries who adopt the goals are adopting standards for the assessment of their own 
progress. Thus, the goals could potentially yield an ambitious social justice and sustainability 
agenda within developed countries as well as developing ones.
31
 
The idea that the SDGs must include, as a whole, “deliverables and commitments” for 
everyone, has been extended further by some states. As one example, submissions by 
developing countries on goal 12, concerning sustainable consumption and production, 
maintain that this specific goal is important precisely because it generates demands for action 
by the more developed countries, and so is needed to ensure that the framework as a whole is 
universal.
32
 On this understanding, the demand for the framework as a whole to be universal 
can lead us to support particular goals targeted more at one set of countries or another in 
order to maintain universality as a “balance” across the whole document. As another, more 
problematic example, the Permanent Representative for India invoked universality during a 
Working Group session thus: “The principle of universality demands an agenda which is 
equally relevant as well as applicable to both developing and developed countries.”33 The 
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idea of equal relevance is a significant extension to the core understanding I have outlined 
above—and one that, as I discuss below, raises difficulties. Universal application as I 
describe it here is a demand of the whole agenda. It is compatible with some goals being 
focused on issues that are distinctively global in nature, and others that look to be more 
relevant to some countries rather than others. One reason to be wary of a demand of equal 
relevance or equal applicability of all goals to all countries is that it might be hard to make 
sense of such a demand, given the diverse range of issues the goals address.  
The content of the SDGs is further constrained if the universal applicability of the goals 
is linked, logically and practically, to the universal acceptability of the goals. Being voluntary 
and nonbinding, these goals will direct only those countries who adopt them. Formally, then, 
they must be acceptable (post-bargaining, and in the light of state interests and values) to all, 
including the major global powers. For example, the representative of Russia on goal 16—
concerning peace, access to justice, and good governance—maintained that:  
 
Goal 16 might be for some reasons important to certain groups of countries or regions. 
But at the same time, SDGs should be universal. Universality of goals implies that they 
can be equally applicable worldwide because they are based on common approaches, 
stay within the agreed framework of Rio+20, and enjoy support by everyone. This is 
clearly not true in the case of Goal 16.
34
  
 
Clearly, there are wider issues at stake in this case. Goal 16 is concerned with a 
number of civil and political human rights. I suggested earlier that the senses of universality 
in the context of human rights and the SDGs are separate, and here they can be usefully 
contrasted. Precisely with respect to such basic protections for individuals, the consent of 
those states that might be suspicious of such rights looks unlikely to be attained. However, it 
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does not (arguably) pose a weighty challenge to the existence of such rights as moral 
entitlements.
35
 In this respect, the idea of universal human rights is independent from the 
consent of a particular state in a way that an avowedly voluntary set of universal goals is not. 
Reflecting this, goal 16 in its final form is unarguably weak on civil and political rights, 
constrained by acceptability as a result of states’ “red lines”—that is, by the limits of what 
they are willing to accept.
36
  
Having outlined the key features of “universality of application,” it is worth pausing 
to consider the consequences of such a principle. Importantly, it directs states toward goals 
that address issues of global importance, and so sets out a common basis for the agenda. It 
might also be thought to express solidarity by inviting or directing all states to consider their 
contribution to achievement of the goals. Lastly, it sets the stage for assessing how the 
benefits and burdens of achieving the goals should be distributed. However, if, as I have 
suggested, universal applicability indeed requires universal acceptability, this constitutes a 
further constraint on the content of the goals. Indeed, it might be that this list of provisional 
goals in its current form is the product of precisely such a constraint. However, universality 
of application does not specify the levels at which goals should be set, precisely how goals 
should be framed, or who should be responsible (and in what measure) for achieving them. In 
the next two sections I look at how rather different senses of universality might address these 
further questions of substance and responsibility.  
 
SDGs: Universal in Not Just Application, but Content? 
 
The idea of universality has also been invoked to do further normative work at the level of 
the content of the goals themselves. One prominent interpretation of universality, widely 
found within and beyond the United Nations, is the idea of zero-based SDGs and 
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concomitant targets as “universal” or “zero” goals.37 Such targets set the end-point or final 
ambition for the goals at “zero” in each of the relevant dimensions (whether regarding 
extreme poverty, as in current goal 1, or the elimination of violence against women, as with 
current goal 5).
38
 Many other goals and targets are expressed in a correspondingly 
universalistic way as a demand for access for all to a certain good. In this sense, universality 
functions as a constraint on the way that the ambitions of individual goals are framed. It 
demands that the goals be “universal in content.” In what follows, I first indicate two further 
ways in which such goals might be thought an expression of “universality of content.” I then 
move on to clarify and defend the normative importance of “universal” or “zero” goals. 
First, the universality of zero-based goals might be taken as inherent in the way they 
aim at the eradication of something bad, everywhere. They set the same end-point for all 
states, “since getting to zero worldwide directly implies getting to (or near) zero in every 
country.”39 Second, they are also universal in the sense that they command looking past bases 
of discrimination and “leave no one behind.”40 As the 2013 report of the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons
41
 expresses this demand:  
 
The next development agenda must ensure that in the future neither income nor 
gender, nor ethnicity, nor disability, nor geography, will determine whether people 
live or die, whether a mother can give birth safely, or whether her child has a fair 
chance in life. . . . This is a major new commitment to everyone on the planet who 
feels marginalised or excluded, and to the neediest and most vulnerable people, to 
make sure their concerns are addressed and that they can enjoy their human rights.
42
  
 
Zero-based goals are recognizably cosmopolitan in form, since they suggest that membership 
of social and economic groups or even states should not provide grounds for differentiating 
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the ambition for the goals. These goals are to be realized for all human beings.
43
 This is not to 
say that the SDGs should be regarded as a cosmopolitan project, or as a full reflection of a 
cosmopolitan account of distributive justice. In this respect, though, they are 
nondiscriminatory, and might even prove to generate a requirement to prioritize the most 
marginalized. 
The idea of zero-based goals as a demand for universality of content is separable from 
the universal application of the set of goals as a whole, but nevertheless compatible with it. 
One such way to connect the universality of the agenda, and the universality of specific zero 
goals, would be to take the unit for universal application not as states, but as the people who 
make up those states. Both of these senses reflect the commitment that the SDG framework 
must be “people-centred.”44 The universality of zero-based goals has been critiqued by, 
among others, Thomas Pogge and Nicole Rippin. In their policy paper on the post-2015 
agenda, Pogge and Rippin contend that zero goals only claim to be universal. They write: 
“Such goals appear to make demands on all countries and yet effectively exempt those that 
are already at or near zero.”45 There are two components to the objection: first, that zero-
based goals are unfair; second, that they are not compatible with universality of application.  
In the senses I have just outlined, zero-based goals are the epitome of universality, 
since the same goal applies to everyone, they set one benchmark for all, and they look past 
potential bases for discrimination. However, this is nonetheless compatible with such goals 
being unequal in effect or in demandingness, since equal targets will necessarily be unequally 
demanding for different countries. If the objection is that zero-based goals are incompatible 
with the idea of universal application, I think the objection is misplaced. Universality in the 
contexts I have examined so far—in both the idea of universal application, and of universal 
zero-based goals—is not a principle of equal, fair, or equitable application. Goals, to be 
universal, need not make equally weighty demands on all countries. However, Pogge’s 
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critique is accurate and important in suggesting that universal targets and goals that set the 
same goals for all will be unfair unless responsibility is correctly allocated for achieving these 
targets. There is a “justice-shaped hole” here, and the fairness of goals that are universal in 
the sense of “leaving no one behind” is contingent on the fairness of the wider framework. 
However, zero-based goals do not themselves necessarily exempt more developed countries 
from action. Such goals are compatible with assigning these countries weighty 
responsibilities to help less developed countries meet them. At this juncture, we could appeal 
to cosmopolitan accounts of global justice to supply such an account of fair shares.
46
  
Goal 17 of the OWG outcome document, which covers global means of 
implementation for the goals, might be thought the right place to address this issue of burden-
sharing. It does explicitly acknowledge some actions on which developed countries should 
lead—for example, overseas development assistance. Beyond this, though, the current 
formulation specifically avoids allocation of responsibilities. It prefers instead the language 
of a “global partnership for development,” reflecting the politically contentious nature of the 
commitments associated with the SDGs. This section on global means of implementation was 
a late addition to the goals, appearing in its current form at the twelfth session of the OWG, 
and it is currently inadequate at recognizing this dimension of fairness within the SDGs.  
In the final section of this article I return to Pogge’s critique as an example of an 
alternative, third sense of universality. On this third account of universality as universal but 
differentiated responsibilities, it is a conceptual impossibility for a set of universal goals to be 
unfair in terms of their formulation. By contrast, I regard the question of fairness in the 
distribution of burdens as in principle separable. This might be regarded as an issue of 
terminology, but it is an important one in assessing the universality of the goals, as I discuss 
in more detail below. None of this, though, is to deny the importance of fairness in a moral 
assessment of the goals. 
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Zero-based goals do indeed look demanding, and especially so for least developed 
countries. Further, many commentators have critiqued them on grounds of pragmatism.
47
 
Unachievably idealistic zero-based goals could fail to motivate or engage states and actively 
harm the power of the resulting framework.
48
 Such goals might open up too great a gap 
between the aspirations that drive the framework and what states might realistically be 
expected to achieve in the fifteen-year time frame. This could permit a great deal of 
discretion for states in how they choose to prioritize and advance toward the goals. There is, 
therefore, a clear role for a set of more realistic and attainable targets at country level that 
nevertheless track the global goals. The advantages of zero-based goals, however, should not 
be overlooked. First, they are clearly and easily communicable in a way that targets set higher 
than zero might not be. Second, if these goals are together to be taken to define the “world we 
want,”49 it looks odd to set the ambition for the eradication of serious harms and wrongs short 
of zero. Lastly, as I outlined above, goals set short of zero invite discrimination against those 
hardest to reach. 
 
Universality and Differentiation in Targets and Responsibilities 
 
I have identified two distinct senses of universality that might each serve to guide and 
constrain the goals. As mentioned earlier, the universality of this framework is adopted 
simultaneously with the principle of state-level differentiation, that is, the need to “[take] into 
account different national realities, capacities, and levels of development and [respect] 
national policies and priorities.”50 In this section I set out the key features and issues involved 
in this demand, and then assess the current proposal for target-level differentiation offered in 
the outcome document of the OWG. Finally, I discuss an alternative formulation that seeks 
differentiation and universality in responsibilities rather than targets. This, I suggest, 
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constitutes my third sense of universality as “universal but differentiated responsibilities.” I 
conclude by examining the plausibility of such a formulation of universality, and how it 
relates to the previous senses.  
On the most abstract, formal account of universality as purely a matter of scope, there 
need be no tension between universality and difference. It is quite compatible to say that the 
goals should apply universally to all, but that the nature of this application is something that 
each country should determine for itself. However, as the two senses of “universal 
application” and “universal content” bite harder on the content of countries’ action agendas, 
the scope for conflict is increased. The idea of differentiation will also affect how this 
relationship should be characterized. For instance, we can identify three relevant components 
of national difference present in the Working Group formulation of universality and 
difference. The first demand for national differentiation arises from different national starting 
points. Were zero-based goals to be adopted, countries’ differential starting points would 
raise a question of fairness and attainability, and differentiation might need to be protected as 
a way to reflect that difference in starting points. A second, related, basis for differentiation 
might be not different starting points, but differential capacities for progress—viewed 
positively as the social resources available, and negatively as the scale of the obstacles to 
progress toward the global goals. Again, this might give rise to differentiated targets to be 
met. A third basis for differentiation would be the protection of national flexibility in how to 
meet these goals and targets, out of a concern, for example, for state sovereignty or state-level 
collective determination. These differing senses of universality, and differing grounds for 
differentiation, combine to yield a variety of relationships.  
In response, the OWG’s formulation sets the goals as universal, with the imperative 
that state-level difference is given its due at the target level. As the OWG outcome document 
states: “Targets are defined as aspirational global targets, with each government setting its 
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own national targets guided by the global level of ambition but taking into account national 
circumstances.”51 Undoubtedly, there are important political and practical imperatives behind 
this formulation. Politically, a framework stipulating too great an impact on national 
sovereignty jeopardizes state support, and so becomes less universally acceptable. Practically, 
local adaptation could generate tailored and achievable targets, frame suitable indicators, and 
enable local accountability.
52
 
However, there are important drawbacks to this formulation. “Universality of content” 
demands that each goal should be met for everyone, everywhere. Discretion, though, permits 
a departure from this logic. As differentiation increases the scope for countries to set their 
own levels of ambition, we might worry that this will adversely affect those who are 
politically excluded or hardest to help.
53
 The greater the discretion, too, the more the 
framework might result in a gap between aspiration and achievement. This subverts the 
universality of the goals through problems of sufficiency and fairness. There is a problem of 
sufficiency, since every country could achieve its self-selected target, but without contributing 
the level required for global achievement of the relevant target. Country-set targets will 
require careful coordination to ensure that global goals are realized. This is especially so 
when the global goals, in areas such as environmental protection, track distinctively global 
goods or threats: any one state’s discretion may threaten the ability of the goals to protect a 
given good for all. There is a problem of fairness, since target-setting discretion allows states 
to set targets that limit their ambitions compared to other states. Discretion born out of the 
imperative of differentiation might sometimes be required by reasons of fairness, as in the 
case (putatively) of the three grounds for differentiation outlined above. However, discretion 
can also erode fairness and (assuming states and people care at least about not bearing an 
unfair share) has the potential to undermine state and public support for the framework. It 
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might result, for example, in a situation in which it made no sense for any country to set for 
itself anything other than the lowest possible level of ambition. 
Target-setting within an account of universally applicable zero goals is a narrow arena 
in which to consider fairness and differentiation. There is a wider critique of the OWG 
formulation from those who want differentiation first and foremost in the responsibilities 
assigned. The third sense of universality I identify, universality as “universal but 
differentiated responsibilities,” arises from this critique. China’s statement at the thirteenth 
OWG lamented that “a ‘universal’ agenda is now dangerously implying that there is no such 
thing as developed country or developing country, that there are no differentiations.”54 The 
objection here seems to be that allowing for differentiation for country-level contextual 
variations downplays or neutralizes the collective differences between developed and 
developing countries. Elsewhere, China and the G-77 have advanced a logic of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), on which developed countries have greater 
responsibilities by virtue of their greater resources, and also on the basis of a special 
historical liability in respect of development via colonialism and greater resource use.
55
 A 
number of civil society organizations, too, link universality and CBDR in just this way.
56
 
Alvin Leong expresses this link when he writes:  
 
A universal agenda can recognize that there are global development norms that are 
generally applicable to all countries (in this sense, all countries are equal or non-
differentiated) and yet at the same time recognize that while all countries have 
responsibilities, different countries have differentiated responsibilities due to 
historical responsibilities and differing financial and other resources and capabilities 
(in this sense, based on principles of equity). In essence, a truly universal agenda 
would require the integration of equality and justice (equity).
57
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This idea of universality as requiring a fair account of differentiated responsibilities is distinct 
from the narrower senses of “universal application” and “universal, zero-based content” so 
far discussed. However, it is not clear why a demand for universality must go beyond such 
senses. A set of goals that explicitly allows for country-level differentiation cannot easily be 
held, as the G-77 position seems to argue, simply to deny the importance of difference. The 
quote from Leong starts by suggesting that a universal agenda can recognize country 
differences—and indeed invokes universality as “application”—but concludes that “a truly 
universal agenda” would “require” the integration of equality and equity. Similarly, to return 
to Pogge and Rippin, their initial specification of a universal set of goals begins with 
universal application—a framework “that assigns clear-cut tasks to every country.” However, 
they soon specify that the task is to agree upon “truly universal goals, i.e., goals that involve a 
fair and reasonable assignment of genuine tasks to all.”58 This rapid move from universality 
of application that assigns some task to everyone, to an account of universality that assigns a 
fair share of the burdens—and nothing less—to everyone, bears further examination. The use 
of “truly” by both Pogge/Rippin and Leong suggests that this was always the essence of 
universality correctly understood. The implication is that any global actor affirming anything 
short of this extended sense has not thought about universality hard enough. However, this is 
not clearly true. The grounds for demanding fair burden-sharing within the SDG framework 
are, I believe, morally compelling. But the grounds for demanding this as a matter of 
universality are less clear. 
One important question is how this third sense of universality stands in relation to the 
two senses I have previously outlined. First, this kind of universality looks as if it is a demand 
of the whole framework, not just of individual goals. Pogge and Rippin, for instance, talk of 
goals that “involve” a fair and reasonable assignment of responsibilities in a way that takes 
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universality as some way removed from the content of the goals and targets at the global and 
state level. “How should these targets and goals be differentiated?” is not the central question 
addressed by this sense of universality and difference. In fact, as an account of how far 
country-level targets should reflect global targets, “universal but differentiated 
responsibilities” looks potentially unattractive. It is not intuitive that targets for each goal 
should straightforwardly track responsibilities, so that countries with lower responsibilities 
for the poverty of their people should be set a lower target in respect to various aspects of 
improving the lives of their people. This account of universality should instead be understood 
as a wider, system-wide demand. 
This third sense, furthermore, might look incompatible with the preceding two. Its 
advocates are clear that it demands more of the SDG framework than universality of 
application or content. However, the two senses of universality that I have outlined above 
both bear on the idea of “universal but differentiated responsibilities.” The kind of 
universality and differentiation at issue in this third account, like the first sense of 
universality I identified, still makes a claim concerning scope of application. Here, it is 
responsibilities rather than the goal framework that are to apply. An account of universality 
and differentiation in this sphere, just as one concerning goals and targets, faces the same 
issues about how far differentiation is compatible with universal responsibilities, and about 
the correct grounds on which to differentiate responsibilities.  
Furthermore, the level of ambition for each goal, addressed by the second sense of 
universality as “leaving no one behind,” is conceptually related to an account of fair burden-
sharing. An account of global justice needs not just to specify the fair share but also the fair 
share of what total. It must define the target point for an account of justice, to be kept in mind 
when levels of responsibilities are assigned. Simon Caney has recently suggested that an 
approach beginning from a concern with fair burden-sharing can be meaningfully contrasted 
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with one that works back from the imperative of resolving the problem at issue.
59
 I am not 
sure how deep this distinction runs, but it might well be that an approach to fairness that took 
universal-as-zero goals and targets as the end-point would look different, at least, to one that 
made the universality of the goals inseparable from the fairness of any distribution of 
burdens. I do not have space to explore here the ramifications of whether fairness is 
demanded as a requirement of universality or as a separate test. My initial assessment is that 
this attempt to link universality and fairness needs further work to establish exactly what it is 
asking for and how it relates to the other senses of universality. But this is not to deny that the 
fairness of this framework is vital. Without the right account of the end-point to be achieved 
and of how burdens should be allocated to realize that end, the SDGs could not be said to be 
just.  
There is a different defense of this use of universality as a vehicle for claims about 
fairness. It might be that the idea of “true” universality as fairness is a purely rhetorical move, 
to be assessed on strategic grounds. It is fully expected, of course, for actors to import their 
own content and interpretations via universality, and to use it as part of a shared language in 
which to conduct negotiations. This third sense might present a well-meaning attempt on the 
part of NGOs or some states to do just that—to frame universality as a way that commits 
states to justice, too. In so doing, it might create a place for fairness in the SDGs in a way that 
would otherwise not be possible. There are risks in such a strategy, however, especially given 
the divisive and difficult questions of evaluating global responsibilities for development. 
While one such account puts universality in the service of fairness, another might equally 
stress the role of interest. Given that what is at stake here is the allocation of burdens for 
realizing the SDGs, the promotion of differentiated responsibilities—and resistance to the 
idea—carries real benefits and costs for states. In one respect, these principled and pragmatic 
motives yield the same outcome. The more different (and perhaps incompatible) senses of 
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universality are operating around the discussions, the less it can be said that there is any real 
consensus on universality after all. In place of universality as the potential “touchstone” for 
this agreement, the prospect is raised of a complex series of debates about the metatheoretical 
division of labor between principles and across the SDG framework, unlikely to be resolved 
reflectively within a year of interstate negotiations.  
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